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Abstract 
It has been argued that the unprecedented availability of trace data may revolutionize the social sciences. 
Still, methodological knowledge is scarce as to how this abundance of data can be used to develop novel 
and important theory. In this essay, we inquire into how the lessons learned from Grounded Theory 
Method (GTM) can be used to build theory from big data. To do so, we review GTM in light of three key 
concepts in social analysis: the continuum of induction, the continuum of generalization, and the level of 
lexicon and theory. Using Habermas’s concept of rational reconstruction we articulate a broader 
“grounded paradigm” that emphasizes the notion of emergence and provides a pragmatic epistemological 
foundation for different types of grounded analysis. On this basis, we propose a model that describes the 
process of theorizing from big data. 
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Introduction 
“When we wake up in the morning, we check our e-mail, make a quick phone call, walk outside (our 
movements captured by a high definition video camera), get on the bus (swiping our RFID mass 
transit cards) or drive (using a transponder to zip through the tolls). We arrive at the airport, 
making sure to purchase a sandwich with a credit card before boarding the plane, and check our 
BlackBerries shortly before takeoff. Or we visit the doctor or the car mechanic, generating digital 
records of what our medical or automotive problems are. We post blog entries confiding to the world 
our thoughts and feelings, or maintain personal social network profiles revealing our friendships 
and our tastes. Each of these transactions leaves digital breadcrumbs which, when pulled together, 
offer increasingly comprehensive pictures of both individuals and groups, with the potential of 
transforming our understanding of our lives, organizations, and societies in a fashion that was 
barely conceivable just a few years ago” (Lazer et al., 2009, p. 721). 
As this quotation illustrates, “big data,” comprised of abundant and ever-increasing trace data, offers 
boundless opportunities for a computational social science (Lazer et al., 2009). It is precisely this 
unprecedented level of trace data that Latour (2010) indicates might revolutionize the social sciences. 
Through direct computational attention to trace data, researchers can potentially skip some pre-
established latent constructs (what Latour refers to as “imaginary”—see Latour 2005) and generate richer 
and more accurate understandings of social life. According to Latour, researchers now have the 
opportunity to directly access large amounts of empirical phenomena and develop insights closer to the 
source. Big data requires novel visualizations and pattern identification (Latour, 2010; Lazer et al., 2009), 
but there is a dearth of guidance for how, broadly, to attend to such a wealth of data. Big data offers an 
opportunity to generate novel theory, but there are limited methodological options for researchers who 
wish to do so. To unleash the power of trace data, scientists might benefit from methodological guidance 
from an approach that focuses on inductive generation of novel theory. Grounded Theory Method (GTM) 
may have something to offer computational social science.  
GTM is intended to enable novel theorizing from large amounts of data (Legewie and Schervier-Legewie, 
2004). Although GTM’s adherents typically work with qualitative data, GTM was originally formulated to 
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accommodate both quantitative and qualitative data (Glaser, 2008; Glaser and Strauss, 1967).1 However, 
the method is extremely labor-intensive and researchers cannot be expected to pour over gigabytes of 
trace data using coding strategies commonly associated with qualitative data—it would simply be too 
manually intensive. Similarly, big data typically does not come in readily comparable numerical form, 
which would lend itself to the sort of ordering that was recommended for quantitative data (Glaser, 2008; 
see also Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The lessons of GTM thus do not necessarily transfer directly to the 
computational analysis of big data. However, perhaps there is some value in using GTM in a more 
fundamental sense—since this is the only widespread existing method for generating theory from large 
sets of unstructured data. 
In this essay, we inquire into how the lessons from GTM apply to computational analysis of big data in an 
effort to generate theory. To do so we first review GTM and then unpack some of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the method by drawing upon three key concepts in social analysis: 
1. The Continuum of Induction: The central tension of GTM involves the role of existing theory in 
induction—can researchers really derive theory from a “blank slate” approach to empirical data? Or 
are their interpretations sensitized by existing theory? This tension is evident in the very foundations 
of social theorizing. For example, in Merton’s (1957) critique of empirically-grounded theorizing, he 
distinguishes between two forms of “post factum” analysis: one that uses existing theory to explain 
empirical contexts, and one that uses empirical contexts to derive new theory. 
2. The Continuum of Generalization: In further conceptualizing the concept of induction, we 
distinguish between substantive and formal theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, Lehmann, 
and Myers, 2010). Substantive theorizing involves highly contextualized and specific accounts of 
phenomena, whereas formal theory is intended to apply more broadly across contexts. 
3. Level of Theory and Lexicon: To support theorizing in GTM, theoretical codes are used to 
generate mid-level concepts and categories from empirical data (Glaser, 1978). Concepts are 
developed by researchers whose interpretations are sensitized by prior experience and familiarity with 
existing theory. This approach is consistent with Habermas’s “rational reconstruction” method for 
social scientific analysis, and his identification of the importance of lexicons as critical enablers of 
scientific knowledge in a community (Habermas 1984; 2003). 
In this paper, we briefly review GTM in light of these three key concepts. We conclude by articulating a 
broader “grounded paradigm” in information systems research that emphasizes the notion of 
emergence—emergence of (1) study design, (2) sense-making artifacts (i.e., categories), and (3) theory. 
This view of the grounded theory paradigm is not intended to supplant GTM for qualitative analysis. 
Rather, it is intended to leverage the insights associated with GTM more widely, and to provide a 
pragmatic epistemological basis all sorts of grounded analysis. This might inform GTM research, but is 
intended to make the key ideas portable for opportunities such as computational analysis of big data.  
Overview: GTM & Computational Analysis of Big Data 
In the middle part of the 20th century, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss sought to bring together the 
rigorous empirical approach of the Columbia school of sociology with the creative, but often less rigorous, 
approach of the Chicago school (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This was motivated largely by the desire to 
inspire new and innovative efforts at theorizing rather than application of existing theories (what Strauss 
referred to as “working” these existing theories, see Legewie and Schervier-Legewie, 2004) in a way that 
was legitimate and acceptable in light of the prevailing, positivistic social science of the time. Thus the 
original goal of the grounded theory effort might be characterized as twofold: (1) to encourage novel 
theorizing; and (2) to develop an empirically-driven methodology to enable this novel theorizing. 
The result was GTM, which has been one of the strongest catalysts for widespread acceptance of 
qualitative research across a variety of social science disciplines (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). Grounded 
theory seeks to develop theoretical concepts and relationships while being informed by intense analysis of 
empirical data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Since their seminal work on the 
                                                             
1 Of course, in the literature GTM has almost exclusively been used with qualitative data. 
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discovery of new theory through this rigorous, empirically-grounded methodology, information systems 
(IS) researchers have adopted the perspective with varying degrees of faithfulness to the method 
(Matavire and Brown, 2011; Urquhart et al., 2010). Sometimes GTM is adopted quite rigorously, and 
other times it is invoked as a sort of catch-all method for qualitative or interpretive research that does not 
necessarily attend to the fundamental tenets of the method (Urquhart and Fernández, 2013). This has led 
to recent calls to take the method more seriously in the IS field (Urquhart and Fernández, 2013; Urquhart 
et al., 2010) as well as in other fields (e.g., Suddaby, 2006). 
In recent years, this attention to GTM as a rigorous and increasingly well-understood method has been 
incorporated into the review process of the IS field, and there is an established discourse around reflective 
and appropriate application of GTM (e.g., Matavire and Brown, 2011; Urquhart et al., 2010). These recent 
trends indicate a maturation of the methodology in the IS field. With this maturation, however, it is 
important to avoid the dogmatism that sometimes accompanies the establishment of discourses within 
the IS field. Dogmatism may close down the discourse precisely when it should be evolving and staying 
current (Ciborra, 1998). In primarily emphasizing the second goal of the grounded theory movement—the 
establishment of a valid methodology—we must be careful not to undermine the first goal—novel forms of 
theorizing. A move toward stringent application of GTM as a method, however positive for the discourse 
concerning that particular approach, may in some ways undermine the spirit of creativity that led to the 
method in the first place.  
In this paper, we look to both preserve the maturation of GTM as a method, but also to carve out a space 
for alternative empirically-grounded inductive approaches that do not necessarily follow the prescriptions 
of GTM, nor the traditionally qualitative approach usually associated with GTM. Particularly in the 
context of the “big data” revolution and computational social science, the unprecedented access to 
different forms of data can drive alternative inductive approaches. Latour (2010), for example, argued 
that the current explosion of digital trace and other computational data offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to explore empirical phenomena without the baggage of traditional qualitative and 
quantitative approaches—they offer the potential for strong, empirically-grounded inductive theorizing, 
yet cannot really be incorporated into the solidifying discourse around GTM. 
GTM in a Nutshell 
Over the years, GTM has evolved into a contested “family” of methodologies, rather than one, very specific 
method (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). This family of methods is replete with variants and rich in reflective 
discourse. There are disagreements on coding procedures (e.g., Kelle, 2007a), the role of existing research 
(e.g., Jones and Noble, 2007), epistemological foundations (e.g., Charmaz, 2000), and a host of other 
divisions. At a very broad level, one can distinguish between ‘classical’ grounded theory that is much in 
line with the original version of GTM as proposed by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and 
‘evolved’ grounded theory as, for instance, proposed by Strauss (1987), Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998), 
or Charmaz (2000; 2006) in the form of ‘constructivist’ grounded theory. From a unifying perspective, 
however, the method can be thought to involve a number of key elements. Strauss alludes to these key 
elements when he describes the motivation behind writing the book (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and 
founding the method: 
“The important thing about that book, which is still not understood by most people, is that… it really 
had three different purposes. One was, we were trying to legitimate qualitative research in a period 
when it wasn’t yet legitimated… The second reason we did it is that we wanted to attack people like 
Blau, Parsons, and Merton, because their theories were being taken over by students and younger 
sociologists… they weren’t challenging the theories, they were just working them… they were dotting 
i’s and crossing t’s of these theories. So we attacked so-called “received” theories that were 
defective…. The third reason we wrote the book is that we wanted to put forward the idea of doing 
theory that was grounded.” (Strauss 1994 in Legewie and Schervier-Legewie, 2004). 
Thus, GTM’s current manifestations flow from these original purposes. First, GTM involves studying 
qualitative data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Urquhart, 2013)—in fact, some have argued that GTM was one 
of the key methodologies for establishing the legitimacy of qualitative research in a number of fields 
(Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). Second, GTM is primarily concerned with the generation of theory—
preferably novel and interesting theory—rather than just “working” pre-existing views (compare also 
Research Methods 
4 Twentieth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Savannah, 2014 
Urquhart et al., 2010). Third, this theory generation is a result of intense empirical analysis. GTM is 
“grounded” in data—typically lots of data. Beyond these three original motivations, there are a number of 
practices that are often explicitly associated with GTM, including theoretical sampling (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Hood, 2007; Morse, 2007), memo writing (Lempert, 2007; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), and 
the development and use of emergent concepts (Glaser, 1978; Kelle, 2007a; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
However, the three key areas—qualitative research, new theory development, and empirically grounded 
induction—are each always present in GTM efforts. This is interesting, particularly since each of these 
fundamental tenets of GTM have been deemed problematic. Next, we briefly describe challenges to each 
of these areas: (1) although it is typically a qualitative method, GTM can also accommodate quantitative 
analysis; (2) although it is aimed at new theory, GTM necessarily allows for existing theory; and (3) 
although GTM involves a rigorous procedure for induction, so do a variety of other methods: 
• Qualitative vs. Quantitative: Although GTM is credited with helping legitimize qualitative 
research, its founders never intended for this process to be exclusively qualitative. In their 
pioneering text, Glaser & Strauss (1967) spell out a procedure for theoretically ordering 
quantitative data in “elaboration tables” to enable the generation of new theory. Although 
qualitative data was most definitely the focus, Glaser & Strauss (1967) went through great lengths 
to describe rigorous alternatives to the “verification” oriented research that is rooted in 
quantitative data. They suggested that rich, quantitative data can also be explored inductively to 
identify patterns and generate (rather than test) hypotheses. Glaser continues to promote this 
same methodology as a way to mine the realms of unused and unacceptable survey data that have 
been generated over the years for further insight (Glaser, 2008), and others have begun defining 
different roles for quantitative analysis in the pursuit of grounded theory (Urquhart, 2013). 
• Existing Theory: Glaser and Strauss originally thought to develop theories without respect to 
existing theories in order to generate new insight. This view, however, has been criticized because 
it is both unrealistic (people always have pre-existing theories in their minds) and leading to 
trivial or non-original results (if analyzing phenomena without existing literature, researchers 
may reconstruct existing explanations) (Urquhart and Fernández, 2013). Similarly, Kelle (2007a, 
2007b) has argued that the understanding of GTM as a purely inductive method does not hold by 
either the Straussian or Glaserian schools of thought. Reichertz (2007) observes that since 
observation is always conditioned by implied theory, GTM is more abductive in the sense of 
Peirce (1992). Proponents of constructivist grounded theory have argued that grounded theories 
are constructed by researchers based on their interactions with the field (Bryant, 2002; Charmaz, 
2000; Charmaz, 2006), much in line with the pragmatist origins of the method (Strübing, 2007).  
• Empirically-grounded Induction: In a (relatively) recent article, Jane Hood (2007) 
distinguishes between GTM and what she describes as the “Generalized Inductive Qualitative 
Model”—which is shorthand for other forms of case-based qualitative research with inductive 
goals. According to Hood (2007), it is not the qualitative aspect, nor the theory generation, nor 
the inductive empirical basis that mark grounded theory. Instead, it is the emergent nature of the 
theory hand-in-hand with research as it is being conducted. Sampling should progress based on 
findings as data are continuously compared (constant comparison) in a theoretically-driven way 
to enhance more insight (theoretical sampling) and should only end when no new findings are 
emerging (saturation)2. In this respect, the concept of theoretical sensitivity (Glaser, 1978) has 
been discussed intensively, and Glaser (1978; 2005) has introduced a total of 41 coding families 
that are intended to help the researcher identify relationships in the data, thereby sensitizing her 
to allow for emergence while avoiding to use preconceived ideas and conceptualizations. Hood 
(2007) argues that it is the emergence, not solely the induction or qualitative methods that mark 
GTM. Grounded research grows organically from within, not through a pre-structured plan. If a 
researcher goes to her data with a purposeful sample based on pre-existing concepts and 
categories, then the design of the research does not emerge, but is pre-specified. In GTM research, 
the “design, like the concepts, must be allowed to emerge during the research process” (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998, p. 33). 
                                                             
2 Glaser similarly identified theoretical coding, theoretical sampling, and constant comparison as key elements for 
research to be called grounded theory (Legewie & Schervier-Legewie 2004). 
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On the basis of this brief analysis, we find that it is neither qualitative data, nor completely novel theory, 
nor the idea of induction that mark grounded theory. The key element appears to be the idea of 
emergence. The design, the concepts, the sample, and the eventual theory, are all expected to emerge 
through the creative, adaptive, yet rigorous processes of the researchers with the data and the sample.  
Abstracting GTM 
For the purpose of guiding computational analysis of big data, next we draw on three areas that are 
fundamental to GTM and relate the method to common streams of social science: (1) the role of existing 
theory in generating new theory (induction); (2) the level of abstraction of theory (generalization); and (3) 
the importance of theoretical codes as concepts to theory generation (rational reconstruction / lexicons). 
The Continuum of Induction: Analysis to Explain & Analysis to Derive 
It is a bit ironic that Glaser was a student of Robert Merton, one of the staunchest and most high profile 
advocates for positivistic, functionalist social science. According to Merton (1957), findings from the 
interpretation of existing data have the illusory advantage of plausibility, but offer very little of value in 
terms of “compelling evidence value” (p. 93). Essentially, Merton argued that while theory used to explain 
existing data may fit that data, there is little reason (in his mind) to accept one theory instead of another 
that might also conceivably fit that data. There is theoretically any number of possible explanations for a 
phenomenon, and interpretive conclusions cannot make claim to providing the “right” lens for the data. 
Of course, a veritable army of interpretive researchers have debunked this view over the years—from a 
variety of pragmatist and interactionist perspectives (e.g., Strauss) or phenomenological and 
ethnomethodological perspectives (e.g., Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Van Maanen, 1979).  
However, Merton did make an interesting distinction in the relationship of theory to interpreted data. He 
describes the difference between using theory to explain vs. deriving theory from the data. When deriving 
theory, the researcher proceeds from observations via empirical generalizations to theory and thus 
reasons inductively (Handfield and Melnyk, 1998). That is, concepts and relationships are derived from 
the data. In explaining data with theory, on the other hand, consequences are deduced from a hypothesis, 
and then compared with empirical observations. That is, existing concepts and relationships are used to 
make sense of data. These two modes of reasoning are captured by the continuum of induction (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The Continuum of Induction 
 
In practice, the distinction between “derive” and “explain” is blurry, and both types of reasoning are 
typically applied in conjunction (Handfield and Melnyk, 1998). This is also the case in grounded theory 
studies, where the researcher starts with initial slices of data, but then compares emergent concepts with 
incoming data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
The Continuum of Generalization: Substantive & Formal Theorizing 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) distinguished between substantive and formal theorizing. Substantive theorizing 
involves highly contextual relationships between variables that are situated in a particular context. Formal 
theorizing generates broader, more general theory. The difference is thus in the level of abstraction 
(Kearney 2007). At this, one can proceed from substantive to (more) formal theory, as indicated in Glaser 
(1967) and elaborated on in Urquhart et al. (2010). Urquhart et al. (2010) provide a nuanced of levels of 
generalization in theorizing by distinguishing between bounded, substantive, and formal concepts. 
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Bounded concepts are intensely contextual, substantive concepts address a “middle range” between the 
contextual and the general, and formal concepts are intended for broad generalizations (see Figure 2). 
 
Substantive Theory
Narrow Generalization
Formal Theory
Broad Generlization
 
Figure 2. The Continuum of Generalization 
 
While the two dimensions have been discussed in seminal works on grounded theory method, they are not 
only relevant to grounded theory studies, but indeed to any study that focuses on emergence. In the next 
section, we will use Habermas’s rational reconstruction to explain how theories in a grounded paradigm 
are developed using theoretical coding—which requires the elicitation of concepts from empirical data.  
Rational Reconstruction, the Level of Theory, and the Level of Lexicon 
Habermas (1984; 2003) conceived of social science in terms of a “rational reconstruction” of empirical 
phenomena within a particular community of researchers. In characterizing social science in such a way, 
Habermas looked to cut a line between the objectivist paradigm of scientific method and the subjectivist 
paradigm associated with interpretive positions (Pedersen 2008). The rational reconstructive perspective 
enabled Habermas to approach science with an appreciation for rigor, evidence, and the methodological 
advantages of the scientific method, without the naïve positivism that often accompanies it. Similarly, this 
view allowed him to appreciate individual interpretations without falling into the relativism of “anything 
goes.”  
 
Rational reconstruction is essentially an epistemological position. Through a rationally reconstructive 
view, communities of social scientists who share a “lifeworld” necessarily also share some level of an 
intersubjective understanding of the world that they study (Habermas 1984). Fundamental to this 
intersubjective understanding is a lexicon of shared vocabulary involving key concepts that reflect the 
assumptions, history, and institutional context of the community. 
 
The lexicon is the scaffolding upon which the scientific community is constructed. To Habermas, any 
knowledge is always with respect to a community, and made sense of (i.e., reconstructed) with respect to 
the lexicon of that community. This lexicon involves “pre-theoretic” elements that enable its members to 
communicate with each other and compare findings—generalizations are always made with respect to a 
particular lexicon (Pedersen 2008). 
 
The lexicon reflects the theoretical lens through which scientists make sense of empirical data. For 
example, the languages of structuration theory (agency, structure, modes of legitimation, domination, 
signification); actor-network theory (translation, material agency, enrollment, intermediaries, mediators, 
etc.); social network analysis (nodes, links, centrality, distance, homophily, etc.) are all lexicons. Specific 
theoretical positions are inherent in the particular terminologies in their contexts of use. Any 
computational analysis of big data requires a theoretical lexicon. “Map reduce” (a process by which 
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computational researchers might define a structure around unstructured data) essentially requires a 
theoretical lexicon—whether explicit or implicit. Applying theoretical concepts and relationships provided 
by a lexicon thus allows the analyst to move beyond mere description. 
 
Habermas’s concept of rational reconstruction can be used to describe how social scientists draw upon 
lexicons to analyze empirical phenomena in relation to the above two continua of induction and 
generalization, and this leads to four major modes of grounded inquiry. From a broad perspective, in 
deriving theory, lexicons are generated or extended in either a substantive or formal setting, based on the 
level of generalization. The result is a new or adapted lexicon. Using a lexicon to explain phenomena 
either substantially (contextually) or more generally may result in new knowledge for that community, but 
does so strictly within the bounds of that existing lexical framework. A framework of these four modes of 
the relationship between theoretical lexica and induction is summarized in Table 1. Next, we provide 
examples of each mode, using structuration theory and social network analysis as examples of lexicons 
commonly used in information systems. 
 
 
Table 1. Continua of Induction, Generalization, and the Level of Lexicon 
 
 Derive Explain 
Formal 
Theory 
Generate Lexicon: Develop or modify 
“general theories” 
 
Example: Extend Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) to include multidimensional networks 
(Contractor, Monge, and Leonardi, 2011) 
 
Use Lexicon: Broadly apply general theories; 
use lexicon to explain. 
 
Example: Apply structuration theory to IS field 
(Jones and Karsten, 2008) 
 
 
Substantive 
Theory 
Generate Lexicon: Develop local or mid-
range theories 
 
Example: Extend structuration theory to the 
area of IT (Orlikowski, 1992) 
Use Lexicon: Extend general theory in 
domain 
 
Example: Apply SNA to open source software 
(Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada, 2006) 
 
Generate Lexicon for Formal Area of Inquiry: In deriving formal theory based on empirical data, 
the lexicon must often be adapted to accommodate new modes of inquiry or forms of data. Thus, while 
generating new theory, the researchers would need to extend the original lexicon with new concepts. This 
may involve drawing on another lexicon. For example, Contractor et al. (2011) extended SNA using the 
sociomaterial lens, thus resulting in a new lexicon to explore “multidimensional networks.” 
Generate Lexicon for Substantive Area of Inquiry: In this case, an adaptation of an existing 
lexicon occurs in two ways. First, it is applied to a context. Second, the lexicon is extended in a non-trivial 
way. In deriving substantive theory through a primarily inductive process, one generates a lexicon that 
serves as the scaffolding that allows analyzing a substantive area of inquiry. An example is Orlikowski’s 
(1992) seminal extension of structuration theory to accommodate IT artifacts in organizational contexts. 
Use Lexicon in Formal Area of Inquiry: In using a formal theory in a broad domain, a general 
lexicon is applied very generally. This does not extend the lexicon, but applies it and makes general 
claims. An example in information systems research is Jones & Karsten (2008), who reported on a review 
of structuration theory in the information systems literature. The general lexicon provided by 
structuration theory (i.e., concepts and relationships) was applied to an entire field. 
Use Lexicon in Substantive Area of Inquiry: In applying an existing lexicon in a specific domain, a 
more general model is used in order to explain the practices in a more narrow (i.e., substantive) field. For 
instance, Grewal et al. (2006) used well-established SNA concepts such as embeddedness and related 
them to success in the context of open source software development. Typical theory-testing studies would 
also fall into this category, as a general lexicon is applied to explain observations made in a sample of a 
population. 
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The four modes as described above are idealized cases, and in research practice we often use aspects of 
different modes. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
“…discovery cannot be stopped, but breaks through both verifications and conceptual schemas 
to provide us with very interesting and important theory.” —Glaser & Strauss 1967, p.185 
 
Glaser and Strauss led a revolution of sorts in social analysis. Through a program of intense attention to 
empirical data, they legitimized a way to generate novel theory that can revitalize a stale discourse. Some 
argue that organizational and IS literature may be stagnating (M Davison, 2010) or not reaching its 
potential (Grover, 2013). Now, particularly given the opportunity that the data explosion provides, it is 
not the time to close down methods for theory generation that are grounded in empirical data. At the 
same time, it is important to capitalize on the maturity of GTM, and to encourage further methodological 
attention in this regard. By proposing a broader grounded theory paradigm, of which GTM is a 
methodology, we look to accomplish this.  
 
The framework we proposed leaves room for different modes of grounded theory development, and 
suggests that GTM as described in seminal works (e.g., Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990) is but one way to do so. The framework has some important implications for IS 
research. While GTM has been alleged to be used as a toolbox for coding data in IS research, instead of 
developing theory (Matavire and Brown, 2011; Urquhart et al., 2010), we contend that the opposite should 
be the case. Not only should we use GTM in order to build theory, but as a discipline we should be open to 
rigorous approaches to developing theory that can be creative and adaptive, where the common 
denominator is that of emergence. At the same time, more recent developments in computational social 
science (Lazer et al., 2009) promise an unprecedented access to different forms of data, thereby calling for 
alternative inductive approaches that move beyond the manual consideration of qualitative data only. 
After all, the big data available to IS scholars is rife with opportunity to rethink phenomena in 
fundamentally different ways, driven by intensive empiricism (Latour, 2010). If one were to compare this 
opportunity in social science to physics, “it is as if every physicist had a supercollider dropped into his or 
her backyard” (Davis p. 696).  
  
The IS field is particularly well-positioned to lead this revolution in social research. First, as a discipline, 
we investigate those phenomena that have made the “big data revolution” possible- the phenomena that 
make computational social science (Lazer et al., 2009) possible in the first place. Second, our discipline is 
devoted to investigating complex socio-technical settings that require us to make sense of large amounts 
of data that pertain to the interaction of ‘the social’ and ‘the technical’ (Orlikowski, 2007). Third, there is a 
very real need to develop novel and accurate theory grounded in large amounts of data instead of 
“working” existing theories, as we are challenged to further develop our intellectual core (Webster and 
Watson, 2002). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the process of building theory from big data, thereby highlighting the importance of a 
lexicon in this process.  
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Big Data
Patterns
Lexicon
Theory
 
Figure 3. The process of theorizing from big data. 
 
 
Traditional qualitative GTM (see left side of the diagram) starts with a sample and generates concepts 
through constant comparison. In this process, concepts are derived from the data and are constantly 
compared to incoming data. Identified concepts may thus extend an existing lexicon and provide the 
building blocks to develop theory. At the same time, an existent lexicon may be applied as the analyst uses 
theoretical codes (e.g., Glaser’s earlier mentioned coding families) in order to make sense of the data.  
 
Computational analysis of big data looks for patterns in the data, but these patterns only make sense when 
filtered through a lexicon such as social network analysis or sequence analysis (see the right side of the 
diagram). The coding strategies used in GTM are too manually intensive for large amounts of data. 
Identified patterns can both extend the lexicon and build the foundation for novel theory. Together we see 
a general model of theory development for empirical data. 
 
In this paper, we took first step towards a grounded paradigm and highlighted the importance of a lexicon 
in this process. We have argued that we, as a discipline, are challenged to develop a better understanding 
of how to develop novel theories. While grounded theory is a promising approach, we can observe that it 
has not yet been made use of to its fullest potential. Specifically, GTM is typically used as a method of 
qualitative inquiry, and there has been debate of some of its fundamental premises, most notably the role 
of prior theory. In this paper, we have argued that we need to focus on the all-important metaphor of 
emergence, and understand how we can (a) use qualitative, quantitative, and computational data and (b) 
consider prior theory in our attempts of building and justifying theory. Based on three key concepts in 
sociological research (level of induction, level of generalization, and lexicon), we have proposed an 
analytical framework that proposes four major modes of research that either generate or explain lexicons. 
The framework is intended to provide a basis to inform theory building efforts in the IS discipline. 
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